INTRODUCTION
There is a large literature on natural resource economics, and another large literature on utility regulation. Here we focus on issues and literature specific to natural gas regulation. 1 Like other utilities, notably telecoms and electric power, the natural gas industry has seen an evolution from a 'traditional' approach based on a regulated, vertically integrated monopoly towards a liberalized model with regulation applied only to those parts of the supply chain deemed to be natural monopoly elements (so-called 'essential facilities'). As with telecoms, there have also been experiments with infrastructure-based competition in areas that are often considered as natural monopolies, in particular long-distance transportation.
In this chapter we therefore describe a range of approaches: 'traditional' regulation of vertically integrated monopoly natural gas suppliers; a liberalized model, based on requiring the owners of transmission, distribution and potentially other essential facilities to provide services to competing suppliers on a non-discriminatory basis ('third party access'); and a model that fosters infrastructure-based competition, i.e. competition between pipelines (so-called 'pipe-to-pipe competition'). We draw out some important features that are specific to the natural gas industry, focusing on:
1. Some implications of the fact that the industry is based on extraction of a natural resource. While this has important policy implications, for example in relation to security of supply and even macroeconomics, our focus
By 'utility regulation' we refer to sector-specific, economic regulation. Without aiming for a rigorous definition, our focus is on governmental interventions affecting the economic organization of the industry, pricing at different points along the supply chain, and rules concerning access to infrastructure. We do not therefore analyse generic issues in economic regulation (e.g. more or less generic competition issues such as cartel formation), non-economic regulatory issues (e.g. health and safety rules), or energy policy issues such as environmental protection.
is on the key regulatory challenges, which relate primarily to the pricing of natural gas. 2. A rich set of economic questions concerning the definition of the service provided by gas transmission operators and its appropriate pricing in relation to economic efficiency and the promotion of competition. Electric power provides a useful point of comparison, but there are important differences between the two industries. 3. As with telecoms, there is a set of issues as to the extent to which different types of infrastructure should be treated as a natural monopoly, and the potential benefits of promoting 'infrastructure-based competition'. This arises both in the long-distance transportation of gas and in relation to gas storage (and LNG).
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the structure and key elements of the gas sector. Section 3 provides background in the economic theory of regulation, focusing on the appropriateness of/need for regulation of different parts of the gas supply chain. Section 4 then describes theoretical issues and practical experience with the three different regulatory models described above: regulated, vertically integrated supplier; liberalization based on third party access ('TPA'); and pipe-to-pipe competition. In Section 5 we provide further illustration of many of these issues through an extended case study of EU experience with the shift from regulated to liberalized models over the last two decades. Section 6 concludes.
DESCRIPTION OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
The key elements of the gas industry supply chain are set out in Figure 9 .1.
Exploration and production Producers explore for gas and develop and operate gas fields, frequently in consortia. Natural gas is extracted from gas fields and transported by pipeline to a gas terminal where some processing takes place. 2
Long-distance transportation (transit pipelines, LNG) Natural gas is then transported to its destination market. The transport of gas from source to distant markets can occur in one of two ways:
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This involves the removal of certain impurities so as to reach 'pipeline quality standards '. forms of storage involve injecting gas into underground formations whose geological characteristics allow them to hold gas, such as depleted gas fields, aquifers or salt caverns. Other forms of supply flexibility are linepack, flexibility in production or import flows and demand side response. 5 Transmission In industry parlance, 'transmission' generally refers to the system of high pressure natural gas pipelines used to transport gas to consumers within a given market. 6 Major industrial consumers, including gasfired power stations, are typically connected directly to the transmission system, as are gas storage facilities, and therefore take gas off the system at high pressure.
Distribution Smaller consumers (smaller industrial and commercial users, and households) take gas at lower pressure, via the gas distribution system. A gas distribution system comprises medium and low pressure pipelines. Gas is taken off the transmission system and into the distribution system, with pressure reduction stations between each pressure tier to ensure that gas pressure is maintained within appropriate ranges, as gas moves down the system. A distribution system comprises many thousands of kilometres of pipes, in a complex interconnected 'mesh', in contrast to the transmission system, which for a given country or region (e.g. a US state) comprises a much smaller number of long-distance lines.
Retail Very large consumers, for example, gas-fired power stations, often purchase gas directly from producers or importers at wholesale level. Smaller consumers purchase from gas suppliers or retailers, who are typically (though not always) vertically integrated with distribution and/or other parts of the supply chain.
Commercial arrangements The majority of gas globally is sold to importers under long-term contracts from producers, and may be resold by importers on the wholesale markets or direct to consumers. In liberalized markets such as the US and UK, gas is also traded on liquid commodity markets known as 'gas hubs'. Trading involves standardized contracts for a range of delivery dates and durations, and may include both physical and financial contracts. The
Regulation of the natural gas industry 409 5 'Linepack' is the volume of gas which is stored in the gas transmission pipelines themselves (above that necessary to maintain minimum required levels of pressure). 6 The distinction between transmission and transit, although customary, is therefore not entirely a clear one. The same pipeline may be used both to carry gas across a country (for delivery in another country) and to deliver gas in that country.
demand and supply balance in a country or connected region determines the market price for wholesale gas in that trading market. Some of the world's major gas hubs are the Henry Hub in the US, the National Balancing Point ('NBP') in the UK, Zeebrugge in Belgium and the Title Transfer Facility ('TTF') in the Netherlands.
WHY REGULATE THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY?
As presented in Geddes (1998) , there is a range of rationales discussed in the economic literature as to why a government may regulate an industry. Below we give a very brief high-level overview of the main theoretical considerations that apply in deciding whether and how to apply regulation. We then discuss the application of these principles to each part of the gas supply chain described above.
Relevant Economic Theory
The two essential goals of regulation are the promotion of efficiency and the protection of consumers. According to the theory of 'natural monopoly', regulation is needed to promote efficiency in situations where an industry displays major economies of scale, 7 so that cost minimization involves having only one producer. A classic example is in natural gas distribution, where it would clearly be inefficient to have two competing sets of pipelines in a single neighbourhood.
If an industry is regulated, then regulators must ensure that they focus on 'dynamic efficiency' as well as 'static efficiency'. At the simplest level, the point here is that if there is a regulated industry in place then a regulator could set very low prices, to the immediate benefit of consumers, even if these prices did not provide a return to the people that invested in the infrastructure (e.g. invested to build a gas transmission or distribution network). However, quite apart from legal and ethical questions, this would not necessarily be in the 410 Regulation and economics 7 A firm enjoys economies of scale if the average cost of a product falls as the quantity produced increases (this is also known as increasing returns to scale). There are many reasons to expect a firm's average cost to decline, at least initially as output expands. For example some costs of production may be fixed, such as land and building for a factory site, and/or higher volumes allow greater specialization of staff. A related concept is 'economy of scope', which arises when it is cheaper for a firm to produce two products together than separately (Carlton and Perloff, 1994) . For example, a bakery may produce both white and brown bread and do so at lower cost than bakeries specializing in just one or the other.
long-run interests of consumers, since under those circumstances no future investment could be expected to take place. 8 The second fundamental goal of regulation is to protect consumers in situations where firms may have market power such that market forces will not be sufficient to prevent excessive pricing or other abuses. This market power can arise because regulation provides a legally enforced monopoly status (for the reasons discussed above); for historical reasons, as is often the case in newly liberalized industries where there is an incumbent that historically enjoyed a legally enforced monopoly status; or because the industry has entry barriers, economies of scale or other features that give rise to market dominance by one or a few firms.
In some circumstances regulation to protect consumers may involve no more than the application of competition law. For the natural gas industry however, the focus is usually on sector-specific regulation, focused on pricing to consumers and/or concerns such as discrimination and margin squeeze in the provision of TPA. In any event, the key point from the discussion above is that the need for regulation depends in part on history, but in general always on the extent to which technological characteristics of the industry give rise to economies of scale and so to concerns about efficiency and/or market dominance.
Below we discuss the application of these issues to the different elements of the gas supply chain. Note that the application will often depend not only on general characteristics, but on specific features of the market in question (e.g. size, history, potential for connection to other markets, availability of substitutes), etc.
Application Along the Gas Supply Chain
We now discuss the economic characteristics of the gas supply chain to identify the likely competition problems and need for regulation in each section of the supply chain.
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A related point is that governments may choose to create independent regulatory agencies, charged inter alia with protecting the interests of investors, so as to give investors comfort that they will not be subject to future arbitrary 'expropriations' of this nature (Newbery, 2001 , chapter 2). The same approach also explains the rationale behind the Energy Charter Treaty, which includes a clause regarding the 'fair and equitable treatment' of investors (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2004, Article 10) . Similar clauses are often found in bilateral investment treaties (see Marshall, Cosbey and Murphy, 2010 for a general discussion).
Exploration and production ('E&P')
E&P is a highly capital-intensive business, with very significant economies of scale. It requires significant investment to find, identify and prove reserves. Production requires investment in drilling platforms, pipelines and terminal infrastructure. There are also important economies of scope between oil and gas E&P, since gas is often found together with oil ('associated gas'). The very large investments involved, and high levels of risk and uncertainty, make E&P largely a business for very large firms. Moreover, risk sharing and diversification encourage multiple firms to share ownership of field areas and platforms, and where they are allowed, to engage in joint marketing.
However, these economic characteristics in themselves are not sufficient to make natural gas E&P markets necessarily oligopolistic in structure: indeed, in the United States there are over 6000 producers of natural gas (NaturalGas.org, 2007) .
In contrast, supply to continental Europe is increasingly dominated by a small number of firms, including the Russian and Algerian 'national champions' Gazprom and Sonatrach. Clearly these firms' strong market positions reflect government policy rather than underlying economic fundamentals (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007) .
The empirical evidence therefore suggests that E&P is by its nature likely to be a competitive activity, and is unlikely to be a 'natural candidate' for economic regulation. Both practical example and theoretical considerations suggest that an adequate level of competition is feasible and likely to occur in the absence of constraints. This is reinforced by the development of LNG, allowing for cost-effective transportation of gas across much greater distances. Where government creates a monopoly or strong market position by fiat, then there is clearly a case for regulation. Where this occurs (e.g. with national monopolies in most EU Member States prior to liberalization), it often takes the form of a pricing policy agreed between the national company and government, rather than explicit or independent economic regulation. In the context of Gazprom and Sonatrach, there is no ex ante regulation, although competition law has been applied in some instances, notably to require the removal of anti-competitive clauses that prevented gas sold to one importer being used to compete with gas sold to importers in other countries, so-called 'destination clauses' (Nyssens and Osborne, 2005) .
Long-distance transit, LNG
There are strong economies of scale in the long-distance transportation of gas, whether via transit pipelines or LNG shipping. The liquefaction of gas and regasification of LNG are highly capital intensive, involving substantial fixed costs. Long-distance pipelines require large amounts of capital expenditure in advance of gas flowing and have large economies of scale because they involve largely fixed costs, and because ex ante the marginal cost of designing a larger rather than a smaller pipeline is relatively small. 9 The large economies of scale with long-distance transportation may reduce the number of potential competitors but it need not imply a natural monopoly. This is because there may be alternative pipelines or LNG shipping from other long-distance locations to a given destination market. The extent of competition, if any, will depend on the potential for other sources of gas to supply the destination market. For example, gas from Russia, Algeria, Norway, the Netherlands, Qatar, Nigeria, Trinidad and other sources may compete to supply markets in Western Europe.
Storage
Natural gas storage facilities (and LNG regasification terminals) enjoy certain economies of scale. The extent to which they are natural monopolies, and the appropriate degree of regulation, are contentious issues that we discuss in detail later in this chapter (see Section 4.2.2). In brief, our conclusion is that storage is unlikely to be a natural monopoly activity except in isolated locations where the size of the market or geological factors imply that very few storage facilities are necessary or possible. With regard to LNG, an LNG facility is simply another source of natural gas and competes with local production and/or import pipelines. It is therefore only a natural monopoly activity in isolated locations that will support only one or very few sources of gas.
Transmission
The distinction between transit and transmission is not a clear-cut one. Both refer to the transportation of natural gas via pipelines at high pressure, typically for long distances. However, at least in Europe the distinction is often made in the industry, and is not without economic content (although, as noted above, EU regulators prefer to avoid the distinction). Transit generally refers to transportation over longer distances (thousands rather than hundreds of kilometres), on a route that begins with a production site and ends at a local market, and may cross many national boundaries. Transit pipelines are often dedicated specifically to transporting gas from one production source to one or a few destinations. In contrast, transmission pipes tend to be within a single country, and form part of a 'meshed' network, rather than a stand-alone system for moving gas from one source to one destination.
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Before a pipeline has been built, the incremental cost of capacity is relatively small, because it is not much more costly to buy and lay a larger pipe. Once a pipeline is in place, its capacity can sometimes be increased by adding compressor stations, but the details of feasibility and cost vary on a case-by-case basis.
Similar to long-distance transit, gas transmission pipelines benefit from considerable economies of scale. When a transmission line is part of a more complex 'meshed' network, then there may be additional scale economies in the form of 'network effects'. For example, it is often easier to add an additional consumer to an existing gas network than to create a new network. Figure 9 .2 illustrates this. If a gas supplier at point A wishes to connect to a customer at point B, the supplier could build a pipe directly connecting A to B. However, the customer is already connected to an existing network. Therefore, it is possible to build a shorter pipe connecting point A to point C and using the existing network to connect A to B.
These economies of scale are sufficiently high that transmission is likely to be a natural monopoly activity in many, perhaps most, situations. Exceptions will apply only where some combination of factors makes the potential for competition unusually high. In practice this is likely to require a geography and permitting rules that facilitate the building of new pipelines, the existence of a number of suitably situated competing sources of supply, and increasing levels of demand so as to support the construction of new pipelines without giving rise to excess capacity. That combination implies low barriers to entry in the construction of transmission lines, and would be relatively favourable to the deregulation of transmission, because any transmission line that attempted to set excessively high prices or otherwise abuse its position would face the risk of losing its customers. Either the pipeline's users themselves would switch to alternative pipelines, or consumers would choose to buy gas from alternative suppliers using alternative pipelines (perhaps using gas from alternative sources).
These points are expanded on later in this chapter, when we discuss the experience with 'pipe-to-pipe competition' in jurisdictions such as Australia and the US that do not always treat long-distance gas transportation as a via free access natural monopoly activity, but allow or even encourage competition between pipelines.
Distribution
Gas distribution networks are complex and highly meshed, with very significant network effects of the kind described above. They have high economies of scale and in general are clearly natural monopolies. The connection of households and business to the gas network is unlikely to be efficient to duplicate. There may be some exceptions for large customers located near to an alternative source of gas supply, but for most customers it would not be efficient to build an alternative distribution network.
Retail
The retail gas business will experience some economies of scale such as marketing expenditure, procurement of gas and IT. However, these economies of scale are likely to be similar to the retailing of other household services such as internet access, TV and telephony, and are unlikely to be sufficient to make retailing a natural monopoly. Competition has been introduced in gas retail in a number of jurisdictions, including since 2004 all of the EU (Recital 18, Directive 2003 /55/EC, 2003 . One notable feature of liberalized retail markets is the convergence between gas and electricity retailing, for all but the largest customers.
Conclusions and Implications
From the discussion above, it is clear that there are significant differences along the gas supply chain. Some activities have 'natural monopoly' characteristics, notably distribution and, for most markets, transmission. Other activities are potentially competitive, notably E&P (in many/most markets) and retail. Other activities may fall in between these two extremes, and require case-by-case evaluation.
On that basis, a number of alternative approaches to regulation present themselves. Logically (though not historically) first, one could choose to regulate only the natural monopoly activities, and promote competition in the others. This approach gives rise to the liberalized market model, based on TPA.
Alternatively, one might argue that this is unworkable and that it is more efficient in practice to retain full regulation of the industry (perhaps excluding E&P). While experience with liberalization in the UK and US suggests that the TPA model is workable, it is sometimes claimed that their success depends on the existence of many competing sources at the production level. One might argue that absent those competing sources, liberalization is ineffective because it simply reinforces the market power of producers. 10 Such arguments would underpin a model based on full regulation of a vertically integrated monopoly.
Finally, one might choose to deregulate all parts of the industry above the distribution level, on the basis of a belief that only distribution is a true natural monopoly, at least for the specific market in question. That approach gives rise to the infrastructure-based ('pipe-to-pipe') competition model.
The next section of this chapter examines these three approaches in greater detail.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATING THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
The 'traditional' approach to regulation in the natural gas industry, which in the jurisdictions with which we are familiar (North America, Europe and Australia/NZ) was the historical norm, involves a statutory monopoly, usually highly vertically integrated, and subject to detailed price and non-price regulation. As discussed above, the main alternative approach involves the liberalization of those elements of the supply chain viewed as contestable (in particular, gas sourcing and retail), while those parts that are regarded as having natural monopoly-like features (in particular, transmission and distribution) are treated as essential facilities, with obligations to offer their services to all potential users on a non-discriminatory basis, and subject to price and non-price regulation. It is analogous to the model that is widely used for other 'network' industries, including electric power, telecoms, rail and postal services. Below we discuss these approaches, as well as the third alternative, pipe-to-pipe competition.
Regulated Vertically Integrated Monopoly Supplier
In most parts of the world, the natural gas industry developed in the form of a regulated monopoly supplier. In Europe, the monopoly was often, though by no means always, state-owned.
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An alternative argument would be to assert that there are strong 'economies of scope' (synergies of various kinds) between natural monopoly and other parts of the industry that make vertical separation of the kind required for third party access inefficient or unworkable. This argument is sometimes made concerning the electric power industry, with a particular focus on synergies between generation and transmission (for example, in joint decision-making on the location of new generation units so as to minimize the total cost of building both the unit and consequent required additions to the transmission system).
The vertical structure varied, with typical arrangements being (1) complete vertical integration along the whole supply chain ('from wellhead to burnertip'); (2) complete vertical integration from the point of importation to consumption (in countries without significant domestic production); (3) vertical integration from production (or importation) through high pressure transportation, with low pressure transportation and retailing to small and medium customers then dealt with by a downstream firm, often a local municipality (so the upstream firm was often described as delivering gas 'to the city-gate').
The prices the monopoly charged to natural gas consumers were either regulated explicitly by a government ministry or agency, or implicitly, being either set directly by government as owner, or negotiated between government and the company.
The reasons for the use of this model reflect a mix of economics and intellectual history. Developing a natural gas industry, in particular the transportation network, involves massive sunk costs and attendant risks of asset stranding and/or hold-up. Investors would naturally look to mitigate those risks, and holding the status of a legal monopoly is a strong safeguard. On the other hand, policy makers through the relevant parts of the last century were generally strong believers in the natural monopoly concept, which would favour the creation of a regulated monopoly.
Many of the challenges involved in regulating prices for the natural gas industry under this model are ones that are common to other regulated industries: issues of incentives and asymmetric information (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993) , the Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson, 1962), 11 etc. These are discussed in other parts of this volume. The industry-specific points of greatest interest arise from the fact that, in contrast to other network industries, the natural gas industry is based on the extraction of a natural resource. This has significant implications for price regulation, because the pricing of a scarce resource involves different pricing principles from those that are commonly used in utility regulation (e.g. telecoms, electric power): as we explain below, in those circumstances identifying the appropriate price involves estimating not only the cost of production, but also a 'scarcity value' that goes into the efficient price and constitutes a kind of premium above production cost.
Implications for price regulation: theory
With regard to price regulation, as in other industries regulation seeks to limit
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The Averch-Johnson effect refers to the tendency of utilities to over-invest in response to regulatory decisions that provide a return on investment that in practice is above the cost of capital. See Chapter 2 by Netz.
prices to a level that covers costs and provides a reasonable rate of return on investments. The key question is the treatment of the cost component that corresponds to acquiring the gas from a producer (the so-called 'wellhead price'). For countries that rely largely or wholly on imports, this is not really an issue as they have limited if any ability to influence the import price (at most, national governments may attempt to negotiate the import price, or help the importer negotiate a better price). In those instances, the normal and obvious approach is to pass through the cost of imported gas from the utility to the consumer, along with the costs of downstream transport, storage, distribution and retail.
Countries with significant levels of production however face a choice as to whether and how to regulate the price of gas at the production level. Possible approaches include:
1. Leave the price unregulated, subject only to competition law, and rely on competition to ensure an acceptable price. 2. Set the regulated price equal to the average cost of production (including a regulated return to investors). This was the approach taken in the US for some decades, as described below. It is however inconsistent with the economic theory of natural resource pricing, as it ignores the 'scarcity value' of gas. 12 To give a simple analogy, a community with very limited access to water should set a high price for water to avoid over-use and the need to ration, even if the water comes from rainfall or other natural sources and has limited production cost. Natural resource economics would call for the price to include a scarcity premium. 3. Regulate the price based on benchmarks such as the price of alternative fuels, the price of gas in other markets, or the price of other forms of energy (e.g. crude oil) in international markets.
In principle, a fourth approach would be to set the regulated price at what economic theory indicates is an efficient level, which would include a premium above marginal cost to reflect the scarcity value of the resource, as explained above. Economic theory provides an elegant theoretical model known as 'Hotelling's rule', which would in principle determine this premium, the so-called 'Hotelling rent' (Hotelling, 1931) . Hotelling showed that, in theory, the price of a non-renewable resource such as natural gas, should have a premium over marginal cost that grows over time at a rate equal
Regulation and economics
12
This statement is something of an over-simplification: more accurately, it ignored scarcity value to the extent it was not reflected in licences, royalty rates etc. charged for natural gas extraction.
to the interest rate. 13 Extensions of the model allow this result to be adjusted to take account of other factors, notably technological progress.
However, Hotelling's rule would not be practical for a regulator to apply. In principle, an appropriate Hotelling rent might be estimated by having the land owner and/or government auction off exploitation rights, since the outcome of a competitive auction would give the appropriate scarcity premium. The regulator would then treat this as a cost to be passed through in setting a regulated price equal to production cost. However, in practice this would not be workable as the price set by an auction at one point in time would not be a good guide to the market-clearing price at future times. That in part reflects the empirical weakness of Hotelling's rule. The rule does not in practice provide a good description of the evolution of natural resource prices, which display considerable volatility (e.g. the well-known incidence of oil price shocks). Setting prices on this basis would therefore lead to periods of excess demand (analogous to US experience in the 1970s, as described below), and periods of excess supply.
Implications for price regulation: experience
The regulated vertically integrated monopoly model has been used in the US and Europe. Within that common model, the degree of vertical integration along the value chain and the scope of regulation have varied across countries. Production in the US has been competitive, while the Netherlands had complex relations between the state and producers. The UK has had very extreme vertical integration in the past, with significant upstream production at one end of the chain and downstream integration even as far as the sale and maintenance of domestic gas appliances (e.g. gas ovens). The form of ownership of the vertically integrated monopoly firm has also varied from country to country: for example, post-war France and the UK had state-owned monopolies, while Germany and the US have had privately owned monopolies.
Below we describe the approach taken in a number of different regimes to gas pricing, illustrating the possible approaches described.
United States
The US gas industry prior to its overall deregulation provides examples of both the first and second approaches to wellhead price regulation described
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If this premium grew more slowly, then a natural resource owner would be better off extracting all the resource as soon as possible, selling it and putting the money in the bank. Conversely, if it grew faster, then the owner would be better off always leaving the resource in the ground. This growth rate is therefore the only one compatible with economic equilibrium and a steady rate of extraction of the resource.
above, since it has at different times and in different circumstances left wellhead prices unregulated, and chosen to regulate them based on cost of service. 14 The Natural Gas Act of 1938 charged the Federal Power Commission ('FPC') with regulating the rates that were charged for interstate natural gas delivery. It gave the FPC authority to set 'just and reasonable rates' for gas pipeline companies to charge for sale of gas. Up to 1954 the FPC interpreted this to require it to regulate the price on the basis that the final price should be the sum of the wellhead price and a regulated allowance for transportation, delivery, etc. This regulated allowance was then set along the same lines as for other utilities, based on historic costs, allowing investors to recover costs plus a reasonable return on investment (rate of return regulation). The wellhead price of gas was not regulated prior to 1954, and was passed through to the end customer in the final price.
In 1954, the US Supreme Court, in its Phillips Petroleum Co v. Wisconsin (1954) decision, incorporated gas price regulation into gas utility regulation. The state of Wisconsin argued that its ability to regulate the rates of local distribution companies could not be effective as long as prices at the wellhead remained unregulated. The Supreme Court agreed with this argument, interpreting the Natural Gas Act as requiring 'just and reasonable' rate regulation of producers as well as pipelines. Thus, the Supreme Court effectively placed wellhead price controls on gas moving interstate, although not on intrastate commerce. This meant that Texas gas sold in Oklahoma was price controlled by the Federal Power Commission; however, Texas gas sold in Texas was not.
The approach taken to regulation of wellhead prices was based on 'cost of service', i.e. it allowed producers to recover their costs and a reasonable return on investment, but not to charge prices that reflected the scarcity of gas as a natural resource. This approach, combined with the limitation of regulation to interstate commerce, led to extensive difficulties and distortions. The regulation of the gas price for interstate gas sales reduced incentives to sell gas interstate and gas shortages developed in states with no indigenous gas. In the mid 1970s, these shortages were sufficiently acute to close down many schools and factories in the Midwest. Regulators responded in classic central planner mode, by introducing non-price-based rationing, with a schedule of prioritized customers. This in turn led to extensive regulatory proceedings and litigation.
The policy was eventually unwound in a series of legislative decisions and FERC orders from 1978 that liberalized the gas market in two stages: first by 420 Regulation and economics 14 For a more detailed history of the development of the US natural gas industry see http://www.naturalgas.org/regulation/history.asp (on which this section draws).
removing wellhead price regulation, and then by a shift away from the system of regulated vertically monopoly towards the liberalized market model described in Section 4.2 below.
Continental Europe
The continental European gas industry illustrates the third approach to price regulation noted above, with a particular focus on pricing based on alternative fuels. The industry was and largely remains dominated by long-term contracts between producers such as Gazprom or Sonatrach, and merchants such as Eon Ruhrgas or ENI, who buy the gas and resell it to final consumers and/or local distribution companies. The typical approach to pricing used prior to liberalization involved setting final prices so as to make the gas competitive with the alternative fuels available to each type of consumer. This was referred to as the 'market-value principle'. The price received by the producer or importer was then set by subtracting from this final price an amount to cover transportation and storage costs and allow a margin for the merchant. 15 The IEA (1998, p. 32) describes the methodology as follows:
… the price paid by the gas company to the foreign or domestic gas producer at the border or the beach is negotiated on the basis of the weighted average value of the gas in competition with other fuels adjusted to allow for transportation and storage costs from the beach or the border and any taxes on gas. There are in principle three different average netback market values. These correspond to existing gas users, new gas users (such as Greenfield industrial plants) and to existing oil users with no dual firing capability (the market value of the latter being the lowest because of the high capital cost of fuel switching). The beach/border base price that is ultimately negotiated will correspond to a level between the highest and the lowest of the three values, weighted across the different end-user customer categories. The base price is usually indexed to oil product prices (usually heating oil and/or heavy fuel oil) or simply to crude oil (on the implicit assumption that the ratio of crude to product prices will remain broadly constant). This is to ensure that effective prices over the life of the contract remain broadly in line with market values.
This 'market value principle' was first developed in the context of the Dutch natural gas industry in the 1960s. 16 Dutch export contracts then served as a point of reference for most gas export contracts to Continental Europe which followed over the next four decades. Altogether more than 250 Bcm/year are imported by EU countries on the Continent under this concept (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007) .
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The generic description given here is a high-level view -of course individual contracts vary considerably in terms of pricing arrangements, risk allocation, etc.
16
See Stern (2007) for more detail on the history and application of the market value principle.
Conclusions
The traditional approach of full regulation of a vertically integrated monopoly has proved ineffective. In the US, attempts to regulate the wellhead ('molecule') price as part of overall regulation led to a divergence between regulated and market values of natural gas, which in turn produced shortages and distortions.
In the EU, the problem was more around excessively high than excessively low pricing, since the monopoly status of the traditional supplier enabled them to set prices to different consumer groups based on the maximum price each consumer could bear. While in principle this might not lead to economic inefficiency, it was clearly unlikely to promote consumer interests.
Liberalized Gas Market Model
The 1970s through to the present have seen a gradual (and in many places still incomplete) transition from the regulated vertically integrated monopoly model described above to an alternative approach that aims to promote competition where possible, while continuing to regulate those elements of the supply chain that are viewed as natural monopolies.
As discussed in Section 3.2 above, this implies in particular regulation of distribution and (in most cases) transmission. In practice the main regulatory issues focus on the regulation of transmission. Access to transmission is fundamental, since on the one hand entry and competition are impossible unless access to transmission is available on reasonably even-handed terms, and on the other hand, a vertically integrated incumbent can use its control over transmission to create price and non-price barriers to competition.
Access to storage is also of great importance to potential entrants. The natural monopoly status of storage is less clear, and has given rise to an interesting ongoing regulatory debate that we describe below (along with a similar debate concerning LNG regasification terminals).
Below we therefore lay out some of the key regulatory issues around access to transmission, storage and LNG regasification terminals in the context of liberalized markets based on TPA.
Definition of transmission services and structure of charges
The core task of the regulator in a liberalized market is therefore to regulate transmission and distribution so as to create a level playing field for competing suppliers. The creation of a level playing field requires the regulator to stipulate not only the overall level of prices, but also the nature of services to be provided and the structure of tariffs (i.e. the tariffs to be charged for individual services, rather than just the overall or average level of tariffs). This is especially the case when the infrastructure owner is part of a vertically integrated undertaking also active in supply, as is usually the case in the early stages of liberalization, which usually involves placing access requirements on the vertically integrated incumbent. A vertically integrated undertaking may have incentives to favour its supply affiliate over third parties, by providing different levels of service and/or by charging more for the kinds of service of greater interest to entrants.
Nature of transmission service provided While identifying the appropriate average price or revenue follows standard principles of regulatory economics discussed elsewhere in this volume, 17 the determination of appropriate transmission services and tariffs has been the subject of a detailed, industry-specific debate. At least in Europe, the most fundamental issue within that debate has been the choice between 'point-to-point' and 'entry/exit' service definitions.
These are best understood as alternative types of transportation contracts, each involving a different bundle of rights and obligations between the TSO and the party using the pipeline (usually referred to as a 'shipper'). The distinctions are illustrated in Figure 9 .3, which shows a hypothetical pipeline system with two entry points (A and B) and two exit points (C and D).
1. Point-to-Point. A point-to-point transportation contract gives shippers the right to enter gas at a particular entry point and to take it off at a particular exit point. A typical contract would thus specify that it gave the right to transport gas from A to C. A shipper holding that contract would not be able to switch either entry or exit points. It would be tied to the route A-C, without any ability to switch to other routes such as A-D, B-C or B-D. 2. Entry-exit. Under entry-exit, the shipper can hold two types of contract.
An entry contract gives it the right to enter gas at a specified entry point (e.g. point A). An exit contract gives it the right to exit gas at a specified exit point (e.g. point C).
A shipper holding a point-to-point contract from A to C could only buy gas from producers located at A, and only sell gas to consumers located at C. This can be a barrier to entry, because an entrant might for example have access to gas at A, and want to book transmission capacity and then market gas to potential customers. Under point-to-point that is not possible, because it cannot book the capacity until it knows where its customers are located. Point-topoint transportation therefore matches practice prior to liberalization, where the vertically integrated monopoly had very precise knowledge of and control over the flows of gas, and could design the network accordingly. The choice between different capacity types entails a fundamental trade-off between allowing shippers greater flexibility in system use, and maximizing the amount of firm capacity that can be sold. Under entry-exit, the system operator has less knowledge in advance of where gas will flow, and may therefore not be able to guarantee as much transportation capacity. The flexibility of entry-exit gives rise to 'virtual hub trading', which in Europe has become an essential element of liberalized gas markets, as described in Section 2 above. The idea behind virtual hub trading is that gas is traded on the basis that it comes 'entry-paid', so that the seller is responsible for getting the gas into the transmission system (by holding appropriate entry capacity), and the buyer is responsible for getting the gas out of the transmission system (by holding appropriate exit capacity). The key point behind this elegant construct is that buyers are indifferent as to who the seller is, and sellers are indifferent as to who the buyer is. That is because the identity of the buyer/seller does not affect the transport arrangements needed: a seller has to hold entry capacity at the point they enter the gas, irrespective of who they sell to, and a buyer has to hold exit capacity at the point they exit the gas, irrespective of who they buy from.
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The use of entry-exit trading therefore promotes liquid spot trading of gas. This is in contrast to the pre-liberalization approach involving bilateral contracts for the delivery of gas at specified exit points, i.e. implicitly involving point-to-point transportation arrangements. Contracts involving point-topoint transportation arrangements cannot be easily traded, because they restrict the source and destination of gas.
The first European market to liberalize, that of Great Britain, has a liquid trading hub of this kind, the NBP. Other national systems have adopted entry- Structure of tariffs At a very high level, the general theory of the structure of tariffs involves the application of the theory of 'Ramsey pricing'. 18 However, we are not aware of the practical application of Ramsey pricing principles in this context. In practice, regulatory debate in Europe has focused on the distinction between distance-based and entry-exit charges. Distance-based charges are a natural match with point-to-point capacity, 19 and involve a tariff proportional to the distance between the specified beginning and end points of a point-to-point contract. Entry-exit charges are a natural match with entry-exit capacity, 20 and involve one charge for each entry point (that may and typically does vary significantly by entry point) and one charge for each exit point (that may and typically does vary significantly by exit point).
From a regulatory perspective, the distinction between distance-based and entry-exit charging systems turns largely on which better reflects costs. One influential analysis of this question concluded that in general distance-based charges were unlikely to reflect costs in an appropriate sense, at least for EU transmission networks, while at least in principle entry-exit charges could do so (Lapuerta and Moselle, 2002 , pp. 5-6):
1. Cost-reflectivity has fundamentally different implications depending on projected system growth and the existence of actual or prospective congestion.
• With growth or congestion, capacity is scarce and tariffs face the primary challenge of ensuring efficient allocation. The relevant cost concept is prospective, related to scarcity value and the marginal cost of construction (long-run marginal cost). • With no growth or congestion, the primary role of the price mechanism is to allocate the fixed costs of previous investments among system users. The relevant cost concept is retrospective, related to the allocation of costs already incurred (average cost). It emphasises cost allocation methodologies designed to correspond to intuitive notions of fairness. 2. In a system that is growing significantly -as is the case in most of Europeand/or suffers from significant congestion, tariffs should principally reflect
Regulation of the natural gas industry 425 18
Ramsey pricing (Ramsey, 1927) specifies in principle how to derive a set of tariffs that will recover the costs of the network (less any revenues from the sale of scarce capacity, where market clearing prices are efficient), while minimizing distortions. 19 Indeed, in industry regulatory circles, distance-based charging and point-topoint capacity are often used as synonyms. 20 Similarly, entry/exit service and entry/exit tariffs are often treated interchangeably.
long-run marginal costs. Complex network interactions imply that long-run marginal costs are unlikely to be closely proportional to contract distance. 3. Distance-based tariffs are therefore unlikely to be cost-reflective in many EU networks, given current and expected growth. 4. Distance-based tariffs can be cost-reflective for long pipelines with unidirectional flows. 5. However, in other circumstances distance-based systems no longer provide cost-reflective charges and are therefore potentially discriminatory. In particular they advantage larger system users whose contract portfolios can reduce transportation charges without any corresponding reduction in real system costs. 6. Theoretical analyses imply that, provided negative entry and exit charges are allowed, it is always possible to set entry and exit charges so that tariffs reflect long-run marginal costs for network service.
Conclusions The analyses presented above imply that entry-exit service and tariffs are in general most appropriate to support a liberalized market. That conclusion has led to the adoption of entry-exit systems in Great Britain, and subsequently to an ongoing shift towards entry-exit in the rest of the EU. However, it has to be acknowledged that the US has largely retained point-topoint service and distance-based charging, while developing a successful competitive market. 21
Development of transmission services and tariffs in Great Britain and the EU
Liberalization of the UK natural gas market took place earlier than in the rest of Europe, and the issues described above were the subject of much debate. In 1992, British Gas considered four possible alternative combinations of service and tariff structures to improve the transparency and competition of the market (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1993). At the time contracts were lengthy and complex, based on point-to-point capacity as described above. The four alternatives were:
• continue to offer a point-to-point service based on average accounting costs ('AAC'); • switch to an entry/exit system based on AAC. This was viewed as a transparent approach, but one that would distort investment signals, as average costs may vary considerably from marginal costs; • continue to offer point-to-point service, but set tariffs based on the construction of a matrix of Long Run Marginal Costs ('LRMC'), specifying the costs of transmission between each pair of points on the 426 Regulation and economics
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For arguments against entry-exit in liberalised markets see Hunt (2008) .
system. This would provide efficiency incentives as prices are based on marginal cost, but it complicates the regulatory process and could be very sensitive to planning assumptions; and • switch to an entry/exit system, with charges based on LRMC. Although using LRMCs makes the regulatory process more complicated than using AACs, they should provide the right economic incentives to the Transmission System Operator.
The fourth option was favoured by British Gas and an entry/exit system based on LRMCs was implemented. The subsequent rapid development of liquid trading at the NBP was a major factor in the successful development of the liberalized gas market in Britain, and served as an example that has inspired a good part of subsequent regulatory developments in continental Europe. For continental Europe, the debate over entry-exit tariffs began early in the century, with the 2002 report described earlier (Lapuerta and Moselle, 2002) feeding into a wider discussion among stakeholders. Despite industry opposition, regulators concluded in favour of entry-exit, and after some delay this conclusion fed into EU-level legislation in the 2009 Gas To enhance competition through liquid wholesale markets for gas, it is vital that gas can be traded independently of its location in the system. The only way to do this is to give network users the freedom to book entry and exit capacity independently, thereby creating gas transport through zones instead of along contractual paths. The preference for entry-exit systems to facilitate the development of competition was already expressed by most stakeholders at the 6th Madrid Forum on 30 and 31 October 2002. Tariffs should not be dependent on the transport route. The tariff set for one or more entry points should therefore not be related to the tariff set for one or more exit points, and vice versa.
Article 13(1) of the Regulation therefore requires that:
Tariffs for network users shall be non-discriminatory and set separately for every entry point into or exit point out of the transmission system. Cost-allocation mechanisms and rate setting methodology regarding entry points and exit points shall be approved by the national regulatory authorities. By 3 September 2011, the Member States shall ensure that, after a transitional period, network charges shall not be calculated on the basis of contract paths.
Gas storage regulation
Gas consumption is highly seasonal (i.e. there is a significant variation between winter and summer consumption). The demand for natural gas is usually higher during the winter, mainly because it is used for heat in residential and commercial settings. Stored natural gas plays a vital role in ensuring
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Gerrit De Geest -10.4337/9781782540465.00018 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/27/2018 02:10:55AM via free access that any excess supply delivered during the summer months is available to meet the increased demand of the winter months (NaturalGas.org, 2010). Moreover, stored natural gas is also used as insurance against unforeseen events, such as supply disruptions or abnormally cold days. The process of liberalization has given rise to a number of debates about storage and the need for regulation. The focus is on two closely related questions. First, to what extent does storage compete with other sources of flexibility? For example, can a supplier without access to storage still serve customers whose demand pattern is sufficiently seasonal or otherwise 'un-flat' to require flexibility in supply, by use of upstream contracts that contain flexibility provisions, or through contracting with other consumers that may have more ability to consume flexibly? Second, to what extent can and should different storage facilities compete with each other?
One view is that storage is a natural monopoly activity, that there are few if any meaningful substitutes for storage, and that full-blown regulation of the price and non-price terms of access to storage is always necessary to create a level playing field in a liberalized gas market. However, this analysis is an exaggerated one. Gas storage is one of a number of 'flexibility' instruments, along with others such as flexibility in production and import flows, demandside responses (whether directly through reactions to prices, or via interruptible supply contracts), flexible responses from the international LNG market and linepack, that are also used to deal with short-or long-term variations in demand. Flexible production is a source of flexibility for countries which have a significant domestic source of gas supply and the ability to ramp up production as demand increases. Flexible pipeline capacity allows a country to draw on increased supply as demand increases. However, this requires some spare capacity to be available at other times, i.e. lower utilization of the pipeline.
A more realistic view therefore is that other sources of flexibility may compete with storage, with the extent of substitutability depending on the specifics of the market in question and requiring quantitative analysis. It is also the case that different storages can compete with each other, although the extent of actual competition will again depend on market circumstances and require careful study. The storage market is therefore less likely to be a natural monopoly as new storage facilities can be built and connected to the network by new entrants. However, the degree of substitutability may vary from one geographic market to another, and there may be a risk of a degree of monopoly power with a very large storage facility such as the Rough gas storage field in the UK (Competition Commission, 2003) .
These issues have been analysed in the context of competition proceedings in a number of jurisdictions, under the rubric of 'market definition'. The adoption of either narrow (gas storage) or broad (flexibility) market definition can be key to findings of dominance. If a narrow definition is adopted, then it is much more likely that one firm may be found to be dominant, whereas, if a broader market is defined, then constraints from alternative flexibility instruments may be sufficient to constrain market power of storage facilities. Below we describe the conclusions of various competition authorities.
Italy The Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ('AGCM') 22 and the Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas ('AEEG'), 23 in a 2007 enquiry on natural gas storage activity in Italy, discussed in detail the degree of substitution between storage and other sources of flexibility (AEEG, 2007) . 24 In its analysis, AGCM/AEEG considered two types of activities where storage is required: daily balancing and seasonal demand modulation. AGCM/AEEG took the view that storage is currently the only means through which gas operators can balance their daily position, due to the absence of a liquid short-term ('balancing') market. 25 AGCM/AEEG considered storage and flexibility in import contracts to be substitutes, but believed that currently the only operator that can effectively enjoy such flexibility in its import contracts is the former incumbent, due to higher bargaining power.
Great Britain
In its 2003 analysis of the purchase of the Rough gas storage facility by Centrica, the Competition Commission stated that, although they 'do not consider that all types of flexibility are equally good substitutes for one another', they 'have not been able to identify a robust basis for excluding any sources of flexibility from the market definition', thus 'broadly accept Centrica's argument that all sources of flexibility contribute to some extent to the Summer/Q1 spread which constrains the prices of Rough' (Competition Commission, 2003) .
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The Italian competition authority.
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The Italian electricity and gas regulator.
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The enquiry was launched to investigate concerns about under-investment in gas storage in Italy, and whether the fact that the main gas storage company belonged to the incumbent gas utility ENI might contribute to any phenomenon of under-investment.
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'Gas balancing' refers to the need for each shipper to input gas into the system within a given time period that matches the amount of gas consumed by its customers in that time period. This is an important point for the development of a competitive market, because entrants may find that lack of access to flexibility, combined with the difficulty of predicting their customers' consumption, constitutes an important barrier to entry. Effective design of 'balancing arrangements' is an important topic in natural gas regulation, although its highly technical nature falls outside the scope of this volume.
EU The European Commission recognized a similar set of substitutes as the Competition Commission for storage services in the recent DONG/Elsam decision (Case No. COMP/M.3868). This case involved DONG, the Danish state-owned gas incumbent, acquiring control of Elsam and E2, the Danish electricity generation incumbents in West Denmark (Elsam) and East Denmark (E2), respectively. Although the decision does not contain a definitive product market definition, it appears to recognize the principle that storage can be part of a wider 'flexibility' market, referring to 'five groups' of 'flexibility tools':
1. storage in dedicated storage facilities; 2. interruptibility or other modulation of customers' demand, e.g. of central combined heat and power ('CHP'); 3. flexible supply contracts (irrespective of whether based on imports, domestic production or secondary domestic supply contracts); 4. flexible trading in gas on hubs or bilaterally (irrespective of whether forward looking or ad hoc); 5. linepack, i.e. storage in transport pipelines by increasing or decreasing the gas pressure in those pipelines.
The Commission left open the question of market definition and whether flexible supply contracts may be part of a wider flexibility market. Flexible supply contracts allow the shipper to vary the flow of gas according to their demand and hence provide an alternative source of flexibility. In the absence of flexible supply contracts, the shipper may need to procure storage to handle demand variation. It did not accept that flexible trading arrangements were a form of flexibility as there was very little flexible trading at Danish hubs.
In both its Exxon-Mobil and its Total GDF decisions (Case No. COMP/M.3410), the Commission retained a distinct relevant product market limited to underground gas storage. The Exxon-Mobil decision involved the global merger of international oil and gas companies, Exxon and Mobil. The Total GDF case involved the acquisition by Total of gas transport and storage facilities in South West France from Gaz de France ('GDF'). This market comprised different kinds of storage facilities (aquifer and depleted fields on the one hand and salt caverns on the other hand), the Commission recognizing that these different facilities had different technical characteristics with respect to volumes that could be stored and injection/withdrawal speed. In Total GDF, the Commission also concluded that at the stage of market development considered in this matter, other flexibility instruments were not part of the same relevant market because, according to the respondents to its market test, these other instruments could not fulfil the main functions of storage (namely, security of supply, public service obligation with respect to meeting peak demand, network balancing) to the same extent as storage assets would. 26
LNG terminals
As for gas storage, there is considerable debate as to whether LNG terminals are essential facilities, for which a requirement for regulated access is appropriate in the same way as for pipelines. One view is that an LNG terminal is simply a source of gas, analogous to a gas field. Requiring third party access to a terminal would therefore be akin to requiring the owner of a gas field to allow others to extract gas from that field. On the other hand, there is a view that an LNG terminal is a piece of natural monopoly infrastructure and should be treated in the same way as pipelines, and in particular therefore should be open to third-party access.
The EU's Second Gas Directive of 2003 has taken the latter view and prescribes third party access to LNG terminals as a rule (in Article 18). However, exemptions may be granted according to Article 22 for new infrastructure, including new LNG terminals. The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ('FERC'), in its 2002 Hackberry Decision, took the view that terminals are a part of production and thus did not require open access (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007) . As discussed in Section 4.1.3, gas production and supply have been deregulated in the US. By treating terminals as part of gas production rather than transport and distribution, the FERC exempted the Hackberry terminal from open access regulation.
Several new LNG projects have been granted exemptions from TPA on a case-by-case basis by the British gas regulator, the Office for Gas and Electricity Markets ('Ofgem') under Article 22 of the Second Gas Directive. In practice, the regulatory authorities have, therefore, appeared to adopt a position close to that of the FERC, albeit on a case-by-case basis. UK regulators Par ailleurs, la question se pose de savoir si les fonctions assurées par le stockage peuvent être remplies par d'autres outils. Il ressort des résultats de l'enquête de marché menée par la Commission que le stockage de gaz remplit les fonctions suivantes : (i) une fonction de sécurité d'approvisionnement/stratégique, (ii) une fonction d'obligations de service public (saisonnalité et fourniture en pointe), et (iii) une fonction d'équilibrage des points d'entrée et de sortie sur les réseaux. Une large majorité des tiers interrogés a indiqué que les autres outils à la disposition des fournisseurs (par exemple un approvisionnement diversifié comprenant des contrats d'achat permettant une flexibilité des volumes à prélever, ou la conclusion de contrats de fourniture interruptible avec les clients finaux) ne permettent pas de remplir ces fonctions dans une mesure comparable au stockage, en tout cas en l'état actuel. (our emphasis) have also required 'use-it-or-lose-it' provisions to guard against any concerns that the main capacity holder(s) at the terminal might withhold supplies from the market by leaving the terminal unused. 27
Conclusions
As the discussion above illustrates, regulation of third party access under the liberalized market model gives rise to complex and potentially contentious questions. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to propose definitive answers to those questions. However, one important high-level observation is that in practice regulators may be challenged to address these issues in an efficient and effective way, both because of the technical complexity and because the contentiousness means they may be subject to considerable lobbying and political pressure.
These challenges are likely to be particularly important in the early years of liberalization when the framework is being established and when success depends on creating a level playing field between incumbent and entrants. Unfortunately that is also a period when the regulator will be a new institution, which can be expected to take some time both to develop technical expertise and in some cases to establish its independence and ability to withstand political pressure. In sum, the difficulties of implementing the liberalized market should not be under-estimated.
Infrastructure-based Competition
In some markets where natural monopoly conditions are not present, it is feasible and potentially desirable to have competition between utilities. However, it is also possible that infrastructure-based competition (also referred to as 'pipe-to-pipe competition') results in a less efficient outcome than a monopoly. Infrastructure-based competition requires duplication of resources, for example two sets of pipelines from a gas field to a transmission network. The increase in costs from duplicating the necessary infrastructure may be greater than the benefits from increased competition. However, while it is clear that having two or more gas pipelines into every home for domestic users would be wasteful, it is less clear that two alternative long-distance pipelines from Russia to Western Europe should be considered as inefficient duplication.
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'Use-it-or-lose-it' provisions require the operator of the terminal to make capacity available to third parties, if they do not utilize the capacity. The provision is intended to prevent the terminal operator from withholding supply to exploit market power.
The telecommunications sector provides an instructive analogy. In many countries, local access infrastructure built to provide cable television can also provide telephony and broadband services. The core network (or backbone network) connecting major urban centres has usually been duplicated by a number of telecommunications providers. The development and role of wireless telecommunications networks has added a further degree of platformbased competition, although there is still considerable debate as to whether wireless services are a sufficiently close substitute for fixed networks. 28 Both of these developments have enabled some degree of infrastructure-based competition to provide telecommunication services. However, there is widespread debate on whether competition is sufficient and whether wholesale access to infrastructure should be regulated to promote competition in retail markets (Majumdar, Vogelsang and Cave, 2005) .
In the US, wholesale regulation of access networks has been removed following a lengthy legal process (Hazelett and Caliskan, 2008) , while access regulation remains in place in the European Union. However, even in Europe, significant deregulation has taken place, with retail regulation removed in almost all markets and wholesale regulation removed in some markets, such as on the core network. There is considerable debate about the effectiveness of regulation in telecommunications markets. There is some evidence of more intense competition in European broadband markets relative to the US, since the removal of access regulation. However, there are concerns about the impact of regulation on the incentives to invest in new high-speed fibre networks under regulation (Cave, 2007) . Experience in the telecommunications sector illustrates how infrastructure-based competition may be sufficient to allow liberalization of a network.
In the gas sector, infrastructure-based competition has evolved in a few countries, including the US and Australia. In the presence of owners of competing infrastructures, there may be little need to regulate prices to prevent monopoly pricing. However, the mere existence of infrastructure-based competition is not sufficient to restrict prices to competitive levels -regulation may or may not be needed, depending on the extent of competition. If competition is not sufficiently rigorous, then regulation of services may be required to prevent monopoly pricing.
There is a tension between relying on infrastructure-based competition and regulation, at either retail or wholesale level. While regulation may be effective in preventing monopoly pricing, it may also discourage the construction of alternative infrastructure. It also imposes direct costs and compliance costs,
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For example, the European Regulatory Framework for telecommunications defines separate fixed and wireless markets (Directive 2002 /21/EC, 2002 . and entails some well-known risks: errors, unintended consequences, and 'regulatory capture '. 29 There are reasons for supposing that effective competition will produce better outcomes than regulation (such as due to avoidance of regulatory gaming and poor incentives for cost efficiency and innovation under regulation), in which case regulators may need to refrain from regulation to promote competition. This issue has led to considerable debate in both the gas and telecommunications sectors (Laffont and Tirole, 2001) .
The potential for infrastructure-based competition is one of the features that distinguish the natural gas industry from electricity, water and most other network industries. Economies of scale and the complexities of water (and sewage) quality issues are a major obstacle to infrastructure-based competition in water. In electricity, the laws of physics are at the heart of the problem: electricity flows are derived from physical laws, and the construction and/or use of one piece of transmission infrastructure has complex implications for flows on every other piece of infrastructure in the system (for example, the export of electricity from France to Germany is known typically to lead to significant flows of electricity also through Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland).
In natural gas, the potential for infrastructure-based ('pipe-to-pipe') competition varies considerably between different jurisdictions, depending on the extent to which the transmission system forms a meshed network as opposed to a simple set of radial connections, as discussed earlier.
Experience with pipe-to-pipe competition
In this section we rely heavily upon Moselle and Harris (2007) . The United States and Australia provide for infrastructure-based competition or competition between pipelines in their regulatory arrangements. In most other places, infrastructure-based competition for gas pipelines is rare. In Germany, Wingas, a joint venture between BASF (a large gas user) and Gazprom, resulted in the construction of a new pipeline network that competed with incumbents. However, many observers, including the European Commission, regarded this investment as a 'lucky combination' rather than as indicative of a more general potential for pipe-to-pipe competition in Europe (Case No. IV/M.1383).
Australia
Australia's geography is very different from that of Europe. The centres of consumption are mainly located in a few coastal areas with production onshore in gas fields a long distance away. Also unlike Europe, TPA is not an absolute requirement. Whether or not TPA is required is decided by the rele-vant authority, based upon a number of conditions, including (National Gas Pipelines Advisory Committee, 1997, Section 1.9):
(a) that access (or increased access) to Services provided by means of the Pipeline would promote competition in at least one market (whether or not in Australia), other than the market for the Services provided by means of the Pipeline; (b) that it would be uneconomic for anyone to develop another Pipeline to provide the Services provided by means of the Pipeline; (c) that access (or increased access) to the Services provided by means of the Pipeline can be provided without undue risk to human health or safety; and (d) that access (or increased access) to the Services provided by means of the Pipeline would not be contrary to the public interest.
Based on recommendations (National Competition Council, 2005 and Productivity Commission, 2004) for two pipeline decisions (Adelaide to Moomba and Sydney to Moomba pipelines), Moselle and Harris (2007) observe that the Australian approach to applying these conditions is as follows:
• There appears in general to be a requirement for at least three competing transmission providers to provide effective competition. However, if buyers of transmission are sufficiently large to have bargaining power of their own (i.e. there is 'countervailing market power'), this requirement is modified.
• It is recognized that holding long-term capacity in a pipeline enables a party to provide transmission services, effectively providing more than one 'virtual pipeline' in one physical pipeline. In the case of Adelaide, the NCC identified four providers (as well as potential for entry), even though there are only two physical pipes, because one of those has three distinct capacity holders. • However, a pipeline or long-term capacity holder must have spare capacity to be viewed as a competitor. The NCC is clear that a pipeline without spare capacity cannot provide a competitive constraint.
• Finally, there must be no potential collusion, either implicit or explicit.
The Ministerial Decision on the Sydney to Moomba pipeline regarded 'the absence of price collusion or coordination' as a necessary condition for a finding of sufficient competition.
United States
In the US, the FERC has provided a framework for assessing pipe-to-pipe competition. In 1996, FERC ruled that pipelines can charge market-based rates ('MBR'), if they can demonstrate to FERC's satisfaction that they do not have significant market power. This would require sufficient competition from alternative pipelines to constrain any potential market power for a particular pipeline. However, at least as of 2007, the FERC had not yet granted any pipeline the right to charge market-based rates. 30 The FERC criteria for assessment of market power is based on: 31
• defining relevant markets (both product and geographic);
• measuring a firm's market share/concentration; and • considering other relevant factors.
The FERC considers a pipeline service is a good alternative to a second pipeline service if the alternative is available, at a sufficiently low price and similar quality. The FERC considers the following.
• Timeliness and availability -alternative capacity needs to be available at the same time as the applicant's pipeline. 32 • Price -the alternative pipeline route must be no more than 10% more expensive than the pipeline's regulated cost-based rates. This is reminiscent of a competition law approach to definition of a market known as the SSNIP test. 33 Customers' profits should be significantly affected by the use of alternative services.
• Quality -alternative services must be comparable. This would include 'firmness' of service and the amount of notice required for nominations. Therefore, interruptible capacity could be an alternative, if applicants could demonstrate an absence of congestion in peak hours.
The FERC defined three geographic markets based on the origin and destination of gas being transported:
• The applicant's pipeline's origin to its destination -the 'parallel-path' market.
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That is not to say that there are no competing pipelines in the US, just that those pipelines face price and non-price regulation just as they would if they did not face competition.
31
The description in this section is derived from FERC (1996).
32
The 'applicant' refers to the party applying to the FERC to charge marketbased rates.
33
The Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price test ('SSNIP' test) is used in competition law to define the relevant market. If a small increase in price (usually in the range of 5-10%) of a hypothetical monopolist is not profitable, then there are substitutes available, so a larger group of products is considered as the relevant market and the test repeated.
• The applicant's pipeline's origin to an alternative destination -the 'origin' market.
• An alternative origin to the applicant's pipeline's destination -the 'destination' market.
In other words, a pipeline from A to B could face competition from another pipeline from A to B, and/or from a pipeline from A to C, and/or a pipeline from D to B.
To recognize an alternative pipeline as providing meaningful competition, the FERC requires that 'the applicant must show that customers could purchase the relevant service from the alternative supplier. Such a demonstration will likely include showing that capacity would be available on the alternative' (FERC, 1996) . In other words, an alternative pipeline does not provide competition if it has no spare capacity.
The FERC also required that for a pipeline to compete in the origin or destination markets (i.e. for a pipe from A to C or D to B to compete with one from A to B), prices at the destinations/origins must be similar. Specifically, for a pipeline to be in the same origin/destination market, the FERC states that a shipper would have to receive the same netback 34 using the alternative service as it would using the applicant's service. For example, suppose there was a second pipeline that went from the same origin to an alternative destination market (A to C rather than A to B). If the second pipeline's transportation rates were higher, the applicant could still include the second pipeline in its market analysis as long as the gas price at the alternative destination was high enough to compensate.
Conclusions
The Australian and US authorities have developed rigorous methodologies for assessing the potential for meaningful pipe-to-pipe competition, based on identifying the real potential for substitution between different pipelines (including pipelines from different sources, or to different destination markets). Reviewing these methodologies suggests that effective pipe-to-pipe competition is likely to be rare. It will be unusual for capacity to be available on a number of pipelines with a common origin or destination, especially if (like the FERC) one requires those origins/destinations to be comparably economically attractive to each other. The availability of capacity on a number of competing lines is most likely to arise in a growing market, where pipelines
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The netback is the price that the shipper receives for its gas at the destination, after paying for transport; it is a measure of the profit that the shipper can make from gas at a point in the network (Moselle and Harris, 2007 
CASE STUDY: EU EXPERIENCE WITH THE LIBERALIZED GAS MARKET MODEL
The main objective of European energy policy for the gas sector has been the gradual liberalization of the sector and the creation of a competitive integrated internal market, with security of supply ensured. The Community legislative process of liberalizing the gas markets began in the 1990s, first with the Price Transparency Directive (Directive 90/377/EEC, 1990) and with basic nondiscrimination requirements in the Transit Directive (Directive 91/296/EEC, 1991) and the Hydrocarbons Directive (Directive 94/22/EC, 1994). These directives were followed by a series of reforms referred to as the first, second and third gas directives or package. Under the First Gas Directive (Directive 98/30/EC, 1998), with the abolition of import monopolies, gradual market opening, accounting unbundling for vertically integrated network companies, and an option of regulated third party network access were introduced. The EU is aiming for the same model of TPA as the UK. The option of negotiated TPA (nTPA) or regulated TPA (rTPA) network access was introduced under the First Gas Directive. Subsequently, the Second Gas Directive (Directive 2003/55/EC, 2003) was adopted in June 2003 and was to be implemented by 1 July 2004. It required full market opening, national sector regulators, regulated third party network access, regulated or negotiated access to storage and further unbundling of integrated companies. It was complemented by the Gas Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 1775 , which expanded on several of the provisions in the Directive. It introduced qualitative obligatory minimum requirements for access to transmission systems (network tariffs, third party access services, capacity allocation, transparency, balancing and trading of capacity rights). Together this formed the Second Gas Package.
Under the EU's Second Gas Directive, cost-based tariffication is the EUwide principle. The actual tariff structure was left open to national authorities on the condition that tariffs were objective, transparent and non-discriminatory. However, as discussed earlier, an entry/exit tariff structure was seen as the best for ensuring non-discrimination. 35 In response to concerns about the slow development of competitive energy markets in the EU, the European Commission launched the energy sector inquiry in 2005. The sector inquiry reported in 2007 and identified numerous problems, including: excessive market concentration/market power, problems with vertical foreclosure (most prominently, inadequate unbundling of network and supply), a lack of market integration (including lack of regulatory oversight for cross-border issues), and an overall lack of transparency. 36 The Commission proposed action in four areas to address its concerns: (1) achieving effective unbundling of network and supply activities, (2) removing the regulatory gaps (in particular for cross-border issues), (3) addressing market concentration and barriers to entry, and (4) 
EU Gas Sector Competition Cases
EU institutions have addressed the same issues in the gas industry through action under competition rules and through their legislative power. 37 Whereas EU Directives or Regulations apply to all, application of competition rules is case-specific and may only have a wider effect through their precedential value.
In the following, we give a broad overview of the European Commission's policy in applying Article 101 (that deals with anti-competitive agreements between companies), Article 102 (abuses of dominant position) and the Merger Regulation. 38 The case law can be regrouped in three categories: conditions for access, market partitioning and long-term contracts. Often cases involve more than one of these categories.
Cases that raised access conditions issues emerged because of either (i) the existence of privileged relationships between bottleneck owners (be it a network, pipeline or terminal) and downstream or upstream companies acting in more competitive markets, or (ii) vertical integration through the supply chain of gas. 39 European competition policy also includes State Aid control. However, the State Aid case practice in the gas industry is of less direct relevance.
Regulation of the natural gas industry
For instance, many import contracts used to include provisions that prevented importers from selling the gas in other than the designated territories (a re-export prohibition). 40 In cases completed in 2003 and 2004, the Commission settled investigations by having such clauses removed from supply contracts with Russian and Algerian producers. These clauses were found to be restrictive because they negatively affected wholesale opportunities. 41 Vertical integration has been considered to adversely impact the incentives of firms to compete. In the Marathon cases, 42 settled in 2004, the Commission concluded that the creation of more transparent access to the transmission networks and balancing rules would address competition issues. 43 More recently, the Commission developed constructive refusal to supply theories of harm by using concepts such as 'primary/secondary capacity hoarding', 'strategic underinvestment', 'capacity withholding', 'capacity degradation' or 'pre-emptive long-term bookings'.
For instance in the RWE and the ENI cases, 44 the transmission system operator ('TSO') 45 maintained high barriers for competitors in downstream markets by making less capacity available to the open market (capacity hoarding) than should have been the case. Similarly, they both 'degraded' the capacity available to third parties (capacity degradation).
The Commission raised issues of strategic under-investment in the ENI and GDF Suez cases. For instance, the Commission argued that GDF Suez had strategically limited its investments in additional gas import capacity at some LNG terminals.
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Finally, in the RWE gas case of 2009, the Commission found indications that RWE may have intentionally set its transmission tariffs at an artificially high level in order to squeeze its downstream competitors' margins.
Conclusions
EU experience indicates on the one hand that liberalization can be made to succeed; on the other hand, that it can be a slow and painful process. The problems identified by the Sector Inquiry, many years after liberalization measures were first introduced into legislation, and the long sequence of competition cases and findings of abuse are indicative of the difficulty that the EU has found in making a meaningful move towards the liberalized model.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
The 'traditional approach' of a regulated, vertically integrated monopoly supplier clearly presents problems and for most markets involves unnecessarily intrusive regulation. Experience in the US and elsewhere demonstrates that price regulation is particularly challenging for natural gas. While pricing for use of the infrastructure is not very different from other utility regulation, setting a price on the gas molecule itself is quite different from pricing in power or telecommunications, because natural gas is an exhaustible natural resource that merits a scarcity premium. The history of shortages in the US, and potentially very high prices in the EU, confirms the challenges around the regulated monopoly model.
Experience over recent decades in the UK and US shows that effective competition is possible in the gas market, so that for most markets the 'traditional approach' is unnecessary as well as difficult to apply. However, EU experience also indicates that the path to liberalization can be a long and difficult one. The debate about the appropriate definition of transmission services and tariffs is theoretically fascinating. In practice, regulators may find it hard to identify the correct approach to this and other challenging issues, particularly in the early years of liberalization. Nonetheless, the varying experiences of the US and the UK indicate that in practice a range of different approaches can support effective competition (which is not to say that all approaches are equally good).
To date the successful introduction of competition in a gas market has largely occurred in jurisdictions that enjoy access to a competitive supply of gas, either through indigenous production or access to diverse sources of imports. Thus competition is best-established in North America and the UK, while the Netherlands (a major gas producer relative to its size) and Spain (which has access to imports from many countries thanks to LNG) are widely considered to be among the closest followers in terms of developing competition. The development of competition in other EU gas markets will be of great interest.
The more extreme version of liberalization/deregulation, based on pipe-topipe competition rather than third party access, appears to be theoretically workable in certain circumstances. However, analysis of the necessary conditions for effective pipe-to-pipe competition, drawing inter alia on the experiences of the US and Australia, suggests that in practice those conditions are rarely likely to be met.
Looking forward, the development of global LNG markets and the growing role of shale gas 46 may enable the extension of competition to a greater number of markets. As extraction of shale gas becomes economical, new countries may become significant gas exporters (e.g. the United States), potentially extending the scope for competition.
Concerns about climate change raise questions about the future of natural gas as an energy source, given that the use of natural gas generates significant amounts of carbon dioxide (albeit approximately half the emissions are due to coal, when used for power generation). However, it may become possible to use natural gas more cleanly using carbon capture and storage (IEA, 2010, section 14.1). Furthermore, natural gas may still be necessary as a back-up to intermittent renewable sources of energy such as wind and solar. Advances in shale gas technology also suggest that natural gas may well be used as an energy source for some time. The natural gas market, and therefore the regulatory issues discussed in this chapter, will remain key elements of energy markets and energy regulation for the foreseeable future. 
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Shale gas is natural gas that has been produced from shale rocks. Although gas has been extracted from shale rocks since the 19th century, production has only begun to rapidly expand in recent years as extraction becomes more economical (Gascoyne and Aik, 2011) . 
